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Abstract 
Corruption studies have become more important in recent years. This paper aims to 
present a literature review on the subject, which shows a table with a summary of 
studies conducted by other authors and then a description of the determinants to be 
considered in this studies, it also takes into account that the probability of being 
exposed slows down the expansion of corruption. It is considered econometric 
specifications using panel data from 26 European Union countries between 2005 and 
2015, to see what determinants can be used when designing strategies. . The 
determinants of corruption are going to be analyzed from the point of view of  several 
economic models and historical factors. The objective of this paper is to analyze the 
impact of the different determinants of corruption and to make a comparison between 
regions where the studied factors have registered different values. To do so, we have 
based our research on different indexes, for example the IPC (index of perception of 
corruption), comparing the European Union with other regions of the world. The model 
is estimated using instrumental variables techniques; comparing variables the 
inequality and openness of the regions with the level of corruption. 
Key words: corruption, European Union, transparency, inequality.  
JEL Classification: B22, C23, H00 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Research into the determinants of corruption remains a current topic of study. This 
work consists of a simple model, where through the population's perception of 
corruption, the economic, political and social context is studied. In any case, the 
models that are uniquely theoretical are not complete, so that empirical results will be 
sought, and although the results are not completely clear, they must be taken into 
account in order to be meaningful.  
The present work marks as an object of study, the analysis of the crime of corruption 
focusing on the public sector, with the aim of reaching an approximation to reality. The 
second of the objectives is, deepening in this specific type of production by collecting 
annual data on international transparency on the perception of corruption by citizens. 
Understand why this crime is committed and what factors and determinants may 
influence, as well as the behavior of its perpetrators, in addition to observing to what 
extent the beliefs and social assessments of this criminal concept correspond to reality.  
Currently, we can talk about various types of corruption. Political corruption and 
institutional transparency will be referred to and the determinants of it. Multiple 
economists blame the poor management of institutions to be a brake on investment, 
business development and innovation (Mauro, 1995).  There are several definitions of 
corruption from various point of view; political, social and economic. For Andvig and 
Odd-Helge (2000), the definition of corruption is "Behavior of a representative of the 
State and of the public oriented towards the achievement of private profits “. There are 
authors who argue that corruption encourage economic growth, Rock and Bonnet 
(2004) maintain that in countries with a lot of centralization the bribes of big 
businessmen in exchange for favorable deals encourage that growth and inversion, it is 
their well-known Paradox of East Asia. In contrast, Mauro (1995)  believes there is a 
negative relationship between growth and investment and corruption.   
According to official data in developing countries, companies that reach agreements 
with public entities have paid $ 40,000 million a year in the form of bribes. The 
population pays the 10 percent increase in projects due to corruption, these surcharges 
reach almost $ 300,000 million. As for the companies, they distort the data on ethical 
business behavior. The companies that implement anti-corruption laws are more 
profitable since they suffer 50 percent less fraudulent cases. In 2017, the highest levels 
of corruption are found in countries that put obstacles in the way of communication and 
NGOs. In a ranking the most transparent countries are New Zealand and Denmark, on 
the contrary, Syria and Somalia obtain the lowest scores and are considered the most 
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corrupt countries (Transparency Internacional, 2009).  
Over the years, Spain has worsened its situation and the perception of citizens about 
the corruption of their institutions is getting higher. In this fact the denunciations of the 
media and the protest have influenced; When a case becomes more mediated, it 
reaches more people and perceives corruption in a more direct way. 
The structure of our work is divided into three sections. First, the description of the rent 
seeking model, proposed by Tullock (1967), and the analysis of the Klitgaard equation 
(1988). Section 2 reviews the literature on the historical factors that determine 
corruption: socioeconomic, political and institutional and demographic. Section 3 shows 
the construction and analytical decomposition of our global corruption indexes for the 
European Union. Section 4 explains the data source and the econometric model, 
including the description of the variables and the theoretical model used to design and 
interpret our estimation strategy. Section 5 presents the conclusions and results of the 
estimation. 
2. THEORIES OF CORRUPTION, DESCRIPTION OF THE MODELS AND 
HISTORICAL FACTORS THAT DETERMINE CORRUPTION: AN OVERVIEW OF 
THE LITERATURE 
There are many thinkers who have proposed theoretical models for valuing corruption. 
Some of the models have empirical demonstration but only the factors used and the 
conclusions of each model will be commented to make a comparison. 
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Source: Own elaboration focusing on the previous literary review. 
Then, each author and his theories will be discussed in greater detail. According to 
Tullock (1967) the rent seeking model is based on an individual's or entity's obtaining 
rents in an illicit manner and not for the habitual and legal exchange of goods or 
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services. In theory, the moral hazard of rent-seeking is high, when incorporating 
surplus loss any income search has incorporated a social cost. Puviani (1903) 
commented on some ways of obtaining income such as payment exemptions or tax 
relief. At the same time, the State uses other methods such as awarding its own 
contracts for the administration, both in terms of production and services. 
Another Olson (1982) theory is that the preferential groups in each country exert 
pressure in different ways and this affects the growth rate of the country itself. In his 
model he uses wage rigidity as a factor, bearing in mind that forced unemployment is 
related to a wage level higher than the equilibrium level; this is explained by the 
pressure groups that keep workers who already have a job protected. When employers 
are able to shift the price of a higher wage to the final cost, they accept favoritism and 
increase unemployment and inflation. This is an example of the social cost of rent-
seeking. 
As per Klitgaard (1988) corruption follows a formula. The factors involved in such a 
formula are monopoly power, discretion and lack of transparency.  
                                                   C=M+D-T                                                                   (1) 
The focus is more on the way institutions work than on more legal ways.  These 
conditions found in the formula are not necessary for corruption to be commented on 
but determining factors that contribute to its appearance. An example of anti-corruption 
policies is the case of the Hong Kong police. This example is more theoretical than 
empirical, it consists of a method that was established in the Hong Kong police to 
prevent bribery. After a short time many corrupt policemen were dismissed but the chief 
commissioner left the country with the fraudulent profits he had obtained. As a result of 
this event, an organization called Independent Commission Against CorruptionI (ICAC) 
was created.  
It is currently one of the most famous anti-corruption bodies. As a result of this 
research, against more institutionalized this society a larger group of officials will seek 
to obtain income illegally. According to Klitgaard: ‘A campaign against systematic 
corruption needs more than better police and better laws. It requires a jolt to the 
balances of corruption. The government must be bold in this shock treatment. It must 
encourage citizens to get involved in diagnosing and improving corrupt systems, and a 
first step are confidential surveys and interviews. Public officials must be challenged to 
design experiments with measurable results that can help break the incentive system 
that stimulates or demands corrupt behavior. Impunity must be eradicated’. 
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Finally, the model made by Mauro (1997) will be treated, empirical evidence shows that 
corruption decreases investment, social spending and diverts resources worsening the 
distribution of wealth. If countries improved their legal systems and policies of 
promotion and anti-corruption, the quality of life of the inhabitants would improve 
considerably, since more than one hundred million people live in poverty (World Bank, 
2000). The author attributes to the size of the state the phenomenon of greater 
corruption the larger the size of the state. Mauro (1995) asserts that bureaucratic 
efficiency is a determining factor of corruption and is inversely related to it. Greater 
efficiency leads to greater political stability. Corruption results in loss of opportunity and 
choice of wrong projects because of rent-seeking. On the other hand, corruption lowers 
investment in education because the lower the level of education of citizens the greater 
the ability of officials to commit fraudulent acts.  
According to Mauro (1998): 'corruption is likely to occur in countries where restrictions 
and government intervention allow excessive profits to be made', since the ultimate 
source used for behavior on income is the availability of rents.  To illustrate, he talks 
about trade restrictions, industrial favoritism policies, price control and government 
control of credit provision. Regarding GDP growth, a highly negative relationship is 
concluded between the level of corruption and the growth of a country. 
We focus on those more specific historical factors that determine the existence of 
corruption and its expansion by Spain as well as in other territories. We will take into 
account the causes as it influences the condition in which each country is and can not 
be generalized for this phenomenon. 
Pharr and Putnam (2000) report in their book disaffected democracies, that the most 
developed countries at an economic and social level, the lack of confidence in political 
leaders is equivalent to the performance of these, the change of social expectations 
and the role of the media of information and communication. In terms of performance, a 
determining factor in explaining the decline in the perception of trust is the fall in ethics 
with which politicians act on behalf of citizens. In terms of education and social 
expectations, there are authors who say that a society with a high level of education is 
more methodical when it comes to judging its leaders, as well as being more sensitive 
to ethical issues. Finally, the role of the media in politics and in society is key: the news 
gives priority to cases of corruption and judicial cases of the rulers of the countries 
(Thompson, 2001). 
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Following the summary table of these models, the factors to be taken into account in 
this study will be presented, some of which will coincide with those of other authors 
presented in the table and others will be the result of further literary research. 
2.1 Socioeconomic factor 
According to Bayley (1966) and others, corruption has multiplied alarmingly in the 
former socialist countries, so they conclude that market economies drive much higher 
levels of corruption and that the current economic reforms have contributed to their 
expansion. Corruption, its modes and characteristics are not exclusive to any specific 
country. Corruption in Latin America, where multiple politicians sell their administrative 
powers, is not different from that of the European Union, where some public officials 
profit from high commissions on public works concessions and defense contracts. The 
consequences and problems will not be treated in the same way if the corruption 
comes from an isolated case or is more expanded. Corruption in Canada is not similar 
to that of Mexico, since the causes and consequences are different. 
Within the framework of the economic determinants that favor corruption, we find those 
that are related to the regulation of markets and the influence exerted by the state, in 
turn there are other agents external to the public power such as large companies, 
mafias and others. Analyzing corruption from an economic point of view allows the 
design of strategies to combat it. Some of the economic impacts of corruption are 
observed in the decision making of large companies is conditioned according to their 
objectives and productive effort. This is due to the diversion of funds from productive 
activities in order to corrupt the public official. 
Other authors such as Luis (1985) defend corruption to the extent that the rules may be 
poorly drafted or excessive public intervention weakens the actions of private 
companies.  There are studies that show a higher correlation between the monetary 
quantity granted by the State in subsidies as a percentage of GDP and the indicator of 
the degree of corruption, even though the lack of econometric demonstration due to 
very weak correlations makes the studies lack support .  
Leite and Weidemann (1999) investigated corruption in resource-rich areas. Their work 
shows that these areas have a more profitable behavior, and therefore more tendency 
to corruption. As a variable they used the percentage of GDP, analyzing in 72 countries 
the exports of fuels and minerals. It is then compared with the international corruption 
index. The conclusion they reach is that the higher the exports are in the GDP, the 
higher the level of corruption. 
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In several studies, quite a few developing countries are at the top of the list of countries 
with corruption, much of it due to the process and globalization they are experiencing. 
Many companies take advantage of this case to demoralize their production or 
business activity, their objective is to reach the maximum level of profit. Seña (2000) 
states that further opening and liberalization of markets will not reduce corruption, as 
many actors are not prepared for such a big change and cannot maintain the same 
level as the rest of the world. 
Compared to the world, with the exception of Singapore and New Zealand, Europe has 
lower levels of corruption, and in the case of Singapore this is due to the anti-corruption 
decisions made by the president in the years 1965-1990, which included rotation in 
public employment, salary increases and random labour inspections. At the other 
extreme are the countries with very high levels of corruption, such as those in Asia and 
Africa, and at the top of the ranking is Equatorial Guinea, which, despite its wealth in 
natural resources, suffers from a high level of malfeasance (World Bank, 2015) 
With regard to the relationship between corruption and tax collection, Reos (2002) 
states that the resources available to the State are affected downwards in relation to 
the budget that has been estimated for that year by the implementing bodies. The main 
characteristic of these budgets is to allocate a maximum in terms of amount of 
expenditure and to approximate a value of what they expect to obtain in taxes based 
on the level of activity in the country. The maximum expenditure target is usually 
achieved, but the expected tax collection is calculated on the basis of statistical 
programs. Thus, when the collection is not sufficient because of corruption of public 
entities and collection institutions do not meet their goals, the state incurs a deficit. The 
way to cover the deficit is by getting into debt, acquiring obligations in future budgets, 
which makes the cost rise over time.  
In markets with a high level of corruption, the services and goods offered are usually of 
inferior quality and insufficient, and at a higher cost. These cases occur in fairly corrupt 
markets or economies where such corruption is used to reduce quality laws or harm 
competitors. 
2.2. Political and institutional factor   
In the socioeconomic field, state actions that affect the economy have been named, in 
this section we will deepen these aspects. When there is corruption in the political 
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sphere, it affects the inefficient distribution of goods to citizens, forgetting social needs 
and giving preference to private entities and thus generating inequality. 
It is traditionally believed that the reasons for corruption were the deficits within the 
political system, more specifically the democratic one (Andvig, 2000). Doig and 
Theobald (2000) define the democratic deficit as ‘the lack of optimal democracies with 
division of powers; and of methods of inspection and balance of institutions’. 
The oligarchies as a form of government encourage corruption as they pursue 
maximum wealth. In an oligarchy they govern a minority group that encompasses the 
country's greatest wealth. When governing in the same way that used to manage their 
fortunes there is a relationship between political power and economic power, in this 
way businessmen become part of the policy and officials make their interests available 
to these private entities (Kaufmann, 1999). According to several studies, the countries 
with the highest percentage of corruption are those with authoritarian regimes rather 
than democratic systems (Amundsen, 1999). 
In the Law of Democratization (Friedrich, 1989) it is stated that the level of corruption 
changes inversely according to the level of conformity of power, and it is also stated 
that corruption can only be fought with a democratic state.  
According to Hope (2000) the relationship between democracy and corruption is 
negative, the lower the level of democracy a country has, the greater it is corruption. In 
Third World countries, corruption has been greater at the social level than at the 
economic level; in dictatorships and authoritarian governments corruption is found 
within institutions while in democratic governments there is higher competition and 
more agents are involved, therefore the potential for corruption is greater (Naim, 1995). 
Andvig and Odd-Helge (2000) argue that there are theories that relate democracy and 
corruption inversely. However, a more and better developed theory would conclude that 
the relationship is not linear but bell-shaped. This result is explained by analyzing the 
process of transition from dictatorship to democracy with very high corruption, while in 
stable democratic or non-democratic periods corruption has no notorious presence or 
is much lower. In a stable government it is easier to control the average levels of 
corruption.  
Johnston (1986) deals with various kinds of corruption depending on its internal logic; 
one of them is patronage and machinery networks, routine tasks that are in the hands 
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of very few and are used to obtain 'extended patron-client networks', making groups 
similar to monopolies either because of their great power of control or their benefits.  
Market corruption is another type that takes place in the exchange of services and 
goods, either through false invoices or bribes for boosting the sale of goods on a non-
regular basis. Favoritism is another form of political corruption, giving opportunities that 
are not available to all family members or friends because of their relationships. Finally, 
critical corruption involves many individuals or parties who engage in huge exchanges 
of goods or services. All of these exchanges usually link private companies with public 
entities. 
2.3. Sociocultural factor  
To justify the study of a society's values and culture and relate them to corruption, we 
may think that without such values there would be no effective or solid anti-corruption 
institutions.  
Klitgaard (1988) argues that illegal acts depend on the country in which we are and 
also on its culture, but the method of bribery or corruption in any country is portrayed 
and condemned regardless of beliefs or customs. Klitgaard's statement is reinforced by 
the opinion of Transparency International, which argues that while the boundaries of 
societies on what is right or wrong are different, in no country is it considered 
appropriate for politicians to be influenced in their decision-making by rewards of some 
kind. 
Tonnies (1947) classified society into two types, the warm society and the cold society. 
In warm societies interpersonal, family or friendship relationships are very frequent; 
and the help between all the members of this network is reciprocal. By contrast, in a 
cold society there are no personal contacts or contacts within the family network. Under 
this assumption, in a cold society it would be more realistic for the government to be 
guided merely by economic and socially beneficial cheerleading than in a quality 
society, where treating people in your circle equally with people from the outside would 
be frowned upon, as the level of trust and relationship would not be comparable, and 
there is no guarantee that the official's decisions would be fair.  
One of the problems that a society faces is when the hierarchy of values is not clear 
and the regulatory systems are not well defined, this usually happens in societies that 
become a modern state of one with a patrimonialist system. Public and private property 
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is often not well defined, and the fastest growing societies have much higher levels of 
corruption (Weber, 1964). 
Swamy (1999) in his study on the relationship between corruption and gender has 
concluded that women are more adverse to receiving bribes; companies run by women 
have a much lower perception of corruption, in addition analyzing 66 countries where 
women occupy high public office levels are lower than those occupied by men. 
Boix and Posner (2000) emphasize the economic and social inequalities that different 
communities have suffered over time. In societies where social capital is positive, it can 
be said that they are more egalitarian, therefore they tend to cooperate more. In 
societies that are more unequal, the opposite is true; the tendency is to be more 
particularistic. In highly unequal societies the internal social capital is not sufficient to 
encourage cooperation, this is due to the strict rules and trust that make cooperation 
outside that network impossible. Therefore it could be affirmed that social capital works 
in a positive way on social development when it is related to ethical and civic 
behaviors, norms and rules that make individuals qualify the behavior shuffling losses 
and gains that non-participants obtain.  
According to Reos (2002) corruption and poverty are related; at the moment of decision 
making against higher is the cost of a project higher level of corruption exists at the 
time of carrying it out, since the control by the organisms designated to fight it is lower. 
Public contracts for works, for example, are not usually assigned to low-resource 
companies due to their difficulty in carrying out the contracts and their low 
qualifications. In many countries, small entrepreneurs are faced with administrative 
work and high controls and regulations that are not faced by a large entrepreneur, 
since the latter can avoid them by means of payments or bribes.  
As a culture we can also cover the media in a country, there are authors who consider 
that nowadays the media report misleading or non-contrasting news and the values 
they promote are not completely correct.  
Little (1992) indicates that in third world countries where the government is in the 
hands of military regimes, corruption is much higher at the level of social and human 
rights than at the economic level.   
Brunetti and Weder (1999), conclude that the independent press helps to control 
corruption. One example they use is that of the Russian Federation, whose press fights 
for clarity and motivates the decline of corruption. 
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Another author who supports the theory of a free press as a method of fighting 
corruption is Reos (2002) who says that free access to information by citizens on the 
behavior and measures employed by those in power is a basic pillar in a democratic 
society. The information will be of public character and will be accessible to everybody, 
being characterized by being of non-exclusion and non-rivalry. 
3. DATA AND ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
This section presents the variables that have been previously mentioned in the 
literature review as probable determinants of corruption, and that will be considered in 
the subsequent empirical exercise, and at the same time more variables will be 
proposed. 
3.1. Data and Variables 
The chosen sample has data from twenty-six European Union countries (1.Germany, 
2.Austria, 3.Belgium, 4.Bulgaria, 5.Cyprus, 6.Croatia, 7.Denmark, 8.Slovakia, 
9.Slovenia, 10.Spain, 11.Estonia, 12. Finland, 13.France, 14.Greece, 15.Hungary, 
16.Ireland, 17.Italy, 18.Latvia, 19.Lithuania, 20.Luxembourg, 21.Malt, 22.Netherlands, 
23.United Kingdom, 24.Czech Republic, 25.Poland, 26.Portugal)   for the period 2005 1
to 2015. The variables of interest are inequality (GINI index), GDPpc and several that 
we will detail below, as well as whether there is a significant relationship with corruption 
and what the symbol of that relationship.  
The following table shows the variables that have previously been named by the 
literature as possible determinants of corruption, and which will be considered in the 
empirical work. Table 2 shows the endogenous (corruption perception index) and 
exogenous (determinants) variables analyzed. The table shows the expected signs as 
well as the sources and authors that support the use of these variables.  
The country of Romania has not been included in the sample due to problems of heterogeneity 1
with the other countries. 
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Table 2. Corruption and determinants, variables to take into account 
Source: Own elaboration focusing on the previous literary review. To comment on the 
value taken by the variable, it is added to the right in brackets.  
First, we must stress that the individuals who commit the corrupt act do not want it to 
come to light, so it is very difficult to measure it accurately. The index to be used 
measures the population's perception of corruption, so it will be taken as an 
endogenous variable. A ranking by country is created that is measured by a scale 
between one (1) and ten (10), against but it approaches to ten smaller it is the level of 
corruption in the country. 
The economic context influences corruption, therefore some variables have been 
chosen to determine it; the first variable is the GDP per capita. This variable has been 
used in several studies such as that of Leite and Weidemann (1999), which helps to 
estimate the economic development of a country, justifies its choice and that a country 
in good economic conditions encourages the denunciation of corruption. The expected 
Category Variable Description Data Source
Endogenous CPI Corruption Perception 
Index (Number 
between 0 and 100)
TI (Transparency 
International)
Socioeconomics GDPpc (-) GDP per capita WB (World Bank) 
Leite and Weidemann 
(1999)
GINI Index (+) Income distribution 
among individuals 
(Number between 0 
and 100)
WB (World Bank) 
Reos (2002) 
Boix and Posner 
(2000) 
Unemployment (+) total unemployment 
(% of active 
population who do not 





percentage of central 
government 
expenditure




per million people WB (World Bank) 




 Seats held by 
women (-)
Proportion of seats 
held by women in 
national parliaments 
(%)
WB (World Bank) 
Swamy (1999) 
Demographic population density (?) per kilometre WB (World Bank) 
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sign for this variable is negative, although in studies (Di Tella, 2004) the result was the 
opposite. 
The GINI Index is used to measure inequality (income distribution) among the 
population of a given country. The figures are between zero and one hundred, with 
zero representing perfect equality and one hundred being the maximum inequality. The 
expected sign of this variable is positive, since the greater the inequality, the greater 
the corruption the country will encounter. The expected sign of this variable is positive, 
since the greater the inequality, the greater the corruption the country will face. 
As far as unemployment is concerned, the expected sign is positive as greater 
unemployment is expected to lead to greater corruption. This is because if 
unemployment is very high in a country, the probability that an individual will report a 
case of corruption is low, as there is a fear of losing the job.  
The variable referring to military spending based on the total percentage of government 
spending in each country is used because in raisons with military regimes corruption is 
higher, but at the same time, in countries where the law and the punishments are more 
severe for those who commit a crime corruption is lower. The sign of this variable is 
noted as indeterminate since it is necessary to see which theory is more accurate when 
we execute the model (Little, 1992). 
With regard to research and development, the number of professionals in this field in 
each country has been chosen as a variable.The justification for this is that if a country 
is more developed and invests more effort in research, it will be more prepared to deal 
with issues such as corruption, and therefore the expected result of the variable is 
negative, with greater development or a greater number of researchers and less 
corruption (Rock and Bonnet, 2004) 
Within the category of socio-economic determinants, the education budget of each 
country could have been added, but it was decided to omit this determinant as there 
was a correlation with GDP, although not perfect. 
The next category is political and institutional, within which the factor of the proportion 
of women holding seats in the parliaments of the various countries has been chosen. 
The author Swamy (1999), justified in his research that when public positions were 
occupied by women corruption was much lower than if they were occupied by men, 
therefore the sign of this variable is expected to be negative. The salaries of officials or 
the number of officials in a country are also variables to take into account but it has 
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been decided to omit them, as we could find a correlation between them and other 
variables in the model.  
Regarding the demographic factors, it has been decided to choose the population 
density in the different sample countries, the expected sign is not clear since there are 
different contradictory studies as to how a greater concentration of the population 
affects corruption. Some studies state that the higher the population density, the 
greater the opportunities for association between corrupt officials in certain jobs, so in 
that case the relationship would be positive and significant. In contrast, other studies 
state that it would be easier to identify cases of corruption due to the low costs of 
administration due to economies of scale in a high-density population, and thus the 
relationship would be negative.  
3.2. Estimation methodology  
This section evaluates whether the above-mentioned determinants have a solid 
relationship with corruption. Panel data with stacked time series have been used in the 
model. To solve the endogeneity problem in the model we are going to use Weighted 
Square Minimums. In order to explain the research in an empirical way, a linear 
regression is used in which the variables explain the corruption perception index.  
General regression: 
Corruption perception index = B0 + B1gdppc + B2gini_index + B3unempl + 
B4dens + B5pol_wom + B6exp_mil + B7resch + µ.  2
The Weighted Square Minimum model will be presented below by means of tables of 
results. Tables 3 and 4 show the correlation matrix and the main statistics of the model 
variables. 
Table 3 shows the main statistics such as the mean, the standard deviation and the 
maximum and minimum values reached by the data. 
As we can see in table 4, the corruption perception index has a high correlation with 
GDP per capita, political positions held by women and the number of development and 
 where gdppc stands for GDP per capita at constant PPP, gini_index is the Gini, unempl is the 2
rate of unemployment, dens is density of population, pol_women is public positions held by 
women in the chamber, exp_mil is military department spending and resch is number of 
research and development technicians per country.
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research technicians. The correlation between the variables is not only high but also 
positive. 
Table 3. Main Statistics 
Source: Own elaboration based on the results of the program used.  
Table 4. Correlation Matrix 
Source: Own elaboration based on the results of the program used. 
4. MAIN RESULTS  
4.1. Fixed effects estimation  
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev Min. Max.
gdppc 286 33189 14634 10211 1,028E+08
gini_index 286 31.51 3.483 23.70 39.00
cpi 286 63.39 16.57 33.00 96.00
unempl 286 9.201 4.493 2.750 27.47
dens 286 183.0 247.7 17.22 1391
pol_wom 286 24.06 9.337 8.700 42.50
exp_mil 286 3.211 1.303 0.8820 7.015
resch 286 3173 1554 916.7 7720
gdppc gini_index cpi unempl dens pol_wom exp_mil resch
gdppc 1.000
gini_index -0.1786 1.000
cpi 0.6513 -0.3462 1.000
unempl -0.3188 0.3985 -0.4360 1.000
dens 0.1147 -0.2275 0.0947 -0.2475 1.000
pol_wom 0.3106 -0.1668 0.5531 -0.0401 -0.1179 1.000
exp_mil -0.5279 0.3982 -0.3389 0.1113 -0.306
0
-0.1746 1.000
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Table 5 shows the results obtained using the weighted least squares of 286 
observations. In table 6 temporal dummies have been added to the model, and the 
relevance of time in the model can be seen. The inclusion of the temporal dummies is 
to observe if there is a random trend in the variables or on the contrary they have a 
constant level and variability. Even so, in table 5 the variable of military expenditure has 
a higher level of significance than in table 6. 
Table 5: Estimation results using weighted least squares 2005-2015 
Source: Own elaboration based on the results of the program used. 
It begins by commenting on the signs of each variable in Table 5 and contrasting them 
with previous literature. As for the GDPpc in the literature a negative sign was 
expected, in our research it is positive, this may be due to the greater development of 
the countries selected in this study compared to others. The sample of this research is 
European Union countries so the level of development is quite high. In this model, with 
an increase of 1 point in the GDPpc, corruption increases by 0,000271.  
In the case of the gini index that measures inequality, it is not significant in the model, 
either because of the data used or because of the existence of another variable that 
better measures this determinant. As an interpretation, an increase of 1 point in 
inequality increases corruption by 0,0367. The expected sign is positive and in this 



























Determinants of corruption. An Analysis based on international Transparency Index
The expected sign of employment is positive, in the model it is negative, this is due to 
the fact that in developed countries unemployment benefits are well regulated and high 
so there is no fear of reporting illegal acts or of losing one's job by committing them. If 
unemployment increases by 1 point, corruption decreases by 0,71. 
The population density in the model has a positive sign, so a 1 point increase in 
population density increases corruption by 0,009. In the literature the sign of the 
variable was ambiguous, this is due to the fact that in rural towns where the population 
is more dispersed and the control to their governments is lower, it is expected that 
there is more corruption than in a big city where the population is more aware of public 
offices. 
The expected sign in the literature when a woman occupies a political position is 
negative, in the empirical demonstration it is positive, this can be due to the countries 
studied or to the period. The increase of 1 point in women occupying public positions 
increases corruption by 0,268. 
In the case of this study, it has a positive sign. In the literature, countries that are 
governed by a military regime are more corrupt than those that are not. In this case an 
increase of 1 point in military spending increases corruption by 1,05225. The variable 
used has a slightly lower level of significance than the rest, because some other 
determinant related to military regimes could have better specified the corruption index 
than spending on military departments. 
Finally, expenditure on research and development personnel is analyzed, the expected 
sign is negative, in the study the sign is positive, the increase of 1 point in research and 
development expenditure increases corruption by 0.00568. This phenomenon could be 
explained by alleging that the more complex projects a country has, the greater the 
opportunity to commit fraud within them; whether it be granting favors, rigging public 
competitions, etc.  
As for the , the model has an explanatory capacity of 86.3% and with the p-value 
(2.4e-116) the variables of the model and the model itself are jointly significant. 
The interpretation of table 6 is similar to the previous one, the difference being that as 
regards the , the model has an explanatory capacity of 88.0% and with the p value 
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Table 6: Estimation results using weighted least squares, add temporal dummies 
2005-2015. 
Source: Own elaboration based on the results of the program used. 
cpi P-valor
const 31.2563  
(4.30)
3.85e-12 ***








0.0003   ***






exp_mil 0.764902  
(0.430996)









 0.0018   ***
dt_4 −6.38882   
(1.43468)
1.24e-05 ***
dt_5 −7.20332  
(1.43215)
9.01e-07 ***
dt_6 −8.23705   
(1.45631)
3.97e-08 ***
dt_7 −8.27357  
(1.45662)
3.50e-08 ***
dt_8 −8.20669  
(1.47464)
 6.35e-08 ***
dt_9 −8.82467  
(1.48945)
9.57e-09 ***
dt_10 −9.53738   
(1.49017)
6.90e-10 ***
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5. CONCLUSION 
Corruption is defined as a situation in which public agents do not act in the manner 
expected by the population, but the extent of this corruption is limited by the 
environment in which it is found. Therefore, in a society where the level of education 
and equality is higher, corrupt acts are more difficult to proliferate. Freedom of the 
press and strong laws are also features that deter illegal acts, as discussed in the 
literature. 
All of the above statements are contrasted with empirical research by authors such as 
Rock and Bonnet (2004) or Hwang (2011). Further analysis taking into account 
corruption-related determinants such as the level of unemployment favors the increase 
of corruption and also covers qualities of the country context.  
This research emphasizes that there are several determinants that are linked to the 
value that corruption acquires and its way of manifesting itself. Determinants such as 
population density or expenditure in the military department that affect differently 
depending on the group of countries or the temporary period employed, in this work 
both are presented with a positive sign. This supports the fact that in the future studies 
of this phenomenon will continue to be carried out, since the temporal space covered is 
from 2005 to 2010 and all the countries belong to the European Union as a whole. 
The disadvantage related to empirical research on corruption is in choosing the 
variables that specify corruption, which is why a discrepancy is understood in the 
literature. The way in which certain variables are measured also influences the 
conclusions, as well as the choice of variables, as in the case of the Gini Index, which 
does not manage to have significance in the work. It can also be the model used and 
the way of estimating it that affects the sign or the relevance of the coefficients. 
Therefore, to correct endogeneity errors, the model of weighted least squares has been 
used. 
The great quantity and quality of empirical research on corruption and its determinants 
does not mean that the subject is consumed, unlike what it entails is a greater 
challenge for future work, where the search for new variables and sources will be more 
difficult. This work, in spite of the difficulties found, recognizes the economic conditions 
(according to the economic development, GDP per capita; unemployment, population 
density...) have a strong significance in relation to corruption.   
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The results of the model are not as expected with the literature previously analyzed, 
even though the variables used are significant and the model is specified. The 
discrepancies in unemployment, for example, are explained by the characteristics and 
social framework of the countries, as much as in this study as in previous studies on 
which the literature is based; thus the expected sign is negative but in the work it is 
positive. 
The same phenomenon occurs with the expected sign in the variable of women who 
occupy political positions, according to the literature, an increase of women in public 
positions and a decrease of corruption, fact that in the empirical part of the work is 
contradicted since we obtain the opposite result, being able to be due to the period of 
time studied or to the characteristics of the chosen sample. 
This paper uses a set of data obtained from the World Bank to obtain empirical 
evidence on the effects of different variables on the corruption perception index, 
obtained from Transparency International.  
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